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1 Introduction
Science eschews concepts that are superfluous from an empirical point of
view. As a case in point, science is averse to the use of the notion of haec-
ceity, “primitive thisness”, in order to individuate objects. Rather, objects
as conceived in science derive their identity from their distinguishing quali-
tative properties, as defined by scientific theory. Science is thus sympathetic
to Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles, with discernibility in-
terpreted in terms of scientific concepts.
Natural as these ideas may seem, their application is not without difficul-
ties. Even objects that are familiar from everyday life seem capable of some-
times violating Leibniz’s principle—think of the case of Black’s spheres, to
be discussed below. The situation becomes only worse in fundamental phys-
ical theories like quantum mechanics and relativity. In the latter case, the
problem is that spacetime points in symmetrical spacetimes (e.g., Minkowski
spacetime) have all their properties in common, so that Leibniz’s principle
would lead to the absurd conclusion that there is only one point in such
spacetimes.
In this article we shall further explain theses difficulties and then defend
Leibniz’z principle, even for the symmetrical cases just mentioned. Part of
our approach will be to invoke the notion of “weak discernibility”, as proposed
in recent literature. Weakly discernible objects share all their properties
(both monadic and relational ones) but stand in irreflexive relations to each
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other—and on the basis of this it is possible to show that there are more than
one of them. However, we shall argue that the application of this notion only
achieves its aim if it is supplemented by a criterion of physical meaningfulness
of the relations and relata in question; and that in the final analysis weak
discernibility only helps out if it can be seen as a degenerate case of strong,
absolute discernibility.
2 The Identity Problem
It is part and parcel both of ordinary life and the sciences to think in terms
of different individual entities. Also both in ordinary life and the sciences, it
seems obvious that empirical distinctions should accompany these differences
in individuality—indeed, how could we have arrived at the concept of an
object in the first place if not on the basis of such empirical differences?
In physics we accordingly expect that different individuals (different par-
ticles, for example) are characterized by different values of at least some phys-
ical quantities. With “physical quantities” we intend those general (qualita-
tive) predicates that figure in physical laws and are thus relevant for empirical
predictions—predicates like “mass”, “charge”, “velocity”, etc. We could of
course posit the individuality of objects by fiat, via the introduction of a
notion of “primitive thisness” or “haecceity”, so that each object comes to
posses its own “thisness” that distinguishes it from all other objects. But
these concepts do not do any work in physical theory and their introduction
is therefore undesirable.
These expectations and intuitions are in agreement with the ideas behind
Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII). Roughly speaking,
this principle says that two putative objects having all their properties in
common are actually one and the same object. In order to be in accordance
with what was just said, we have to restrict the domain of the properties
considered in PII so as to include only physical quantities. If we take these
quantities to include absolute position, as is reasonable within Newtonian
mechanics with its absolute space, PII is fully satisfied by classical particles
[7, Ch. 2]. Indeed, these particles are impenetrable so that they cannot
occupy the same position in absolute space. Even if two Newtonian particles
posses exactly the same mass,charge, and other physical attributes, they
must still differ in where they are—and this is sufficient to ground their
individuality in a physically acceptable way.
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However, on second thought complications arise, even for classical physics.
The status of absolute space has been a bone of contention in the history
of physics: it has been proposed repeatedly that space in itself is not a vi-
able physical concept, and that we should rather think along the lines of
Leibnizean relationism. According to the relationist position only the parti-
cles themselves exist, without being embedded in an independently existing
space. The essential relationist idea is that the particles can nevertheless have
spatial relations with respect to each other—these are possessed directly by
the particles. Now, we do not need to take sides in the relationist-absolutist
debate in order to acknowledge that relationism is a conceptual possibility. It
seems commonsensical to accept the consistency of considering two (or more)
particles that have distances etc. relative to each other without being pinned
down in an absolute background space. But this conceptual possibility spells
trouble for Leibniz’s principle PII.
Indeed, even staying within the domain of everyday experience and with-
out entering physical theory proper, it now seems possible to construct coun-
terexamples to PII. These are cases in which it is obvious that there are
several individuals, but in which there are no distinguishing qualitative char-
acteristics, so that the individuals are indiscernible. One famous case, pro-
posed by Max Black [2], is that of two perfect spheres of identical chemical
composition and at a mutual distance of two miles in a relational universe
(so there is no absolute background space). Another example is provided
by a relational universe consisting of two hands that are each other’s mirror
images (Kant’s enantiomorphic hands). The essential feature of these cases
is that the objects have all their properties in common, both in the sense
of monadic and relational predicates. Thus, both spheres in Black’s exam-
ple have the same material characteristics, and both are at two miles from
a sphere. Similarly, Kant’s hands each have the same internal geometric
properties and both are mirror images of a hand. So these cases seemingly
demonstrate that already in ordinary life we think in terms of concepts of ob-
ject and individuality that are independent of the presence of distinguishing
qualitative differences—in violation of PII.
The situation becomes even more urgent when we consider physical the-
ory. A notorious obstacle for PII comes from quantum mechanics, in which
the notion of “identical particles” plays a major role. These are particles
of the same kind, i.e., with the same intrinsic properties (like mass, charge,
spin); e.g., electrons, protons or neutrons. It is a basic principle of quan-
tum mechanics that the state of a collection of such particles is completely
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symmetrical (in the case of bosons) or anti-symmetrical (fermions) with re-
spect to the particle indices occurring in it. This symmetrization postulate
implies that all one-particle states represented in the total state describing
a collection of identical particles occur symmetrically in it: exchanging two
one-particle states in the total state leaves the total state invariant (apart
from a physically insignificant change of sign in the case of fermions). In
other words, it does not matter which particle index we associate with which
state. It follows from this symmetry that any property or relation that can
be attributed, on the basis of the total quantum state, to any one particle
has to be attributed to each of the other particles as well. Again, we are
facing an apparent violation of PII.
The possible counterexamples to PII that will concern us most in this
article are of a geometrical nature. To start with, consider the (infinite) Eu-
clidean plane. This is a highly symmetrical geometrical object: it is invariant
under translations, rotations and reflections. It follows that there are no priv-
ileged points in the Euclidean plane—indeed, symmetry transformations can
transform any given point into any other, leaving all geometrical properties
of these points and all mutual geometrical relations the same. This entails
that each and every point in the plane possesses exactly the same geometrical
status: the plane looks exactly the same viewed from whatever point. Clearly
then, the points in the Euclidean plane fail to be discernible on the basis of
their geometrical properties. If we assume that there are no haecceities that
transcend geometrical properties, application of Leibniz’s principle PII then
appears to lead us to the (absurd) conclusion that there is only one point in
the Euclidean plane.
The same argument can be given a more physical turn if we apply it to
Newton’s absolute space. However, let us immediately go on to special rel-
ativity theory and consider empty Minkowski spacetime. Special relativity
posits four-dimensional Minkowski spacetime as the fixed geometrical back-
ground against which all physical processes evolve. Minkowski spacetime
is endowed with a distance function: between any two points in it a defi-
nite distance is defined. The situation is more complicated, however, than
in the Newtonian or Euclidean case: the special relativistic distance func-
tion can assume both positive and negative values, and moreover there are
non-coinciding points between which the Minkowski distance is zero. From
each point in Minkowski spacetime the total spacetime can accordingly be
divided into three parts: all points that have a positive spacetime distance
with respect to the chosen point (points with time-like separation); points
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at zero distance (points with light-like separation); and points that possess a
negative distance (points with space-like separation)1. The points with time-
like separation lie in the interior of the lightcone that can be drawn from the
fiducial point in question; the points with space-like separation are outside of
the lightcone; the lightcone itself consists of all points whose distance to the
fiducial point vanishes. Because of this more involved metrical structure the
symmetries of Minkowski spacetime assume a more complicated form than
those of Euclidean space, but it remains nevertheless true that there are
no privileged points. Minkowski spacetime looks exactly the same as seen
from any spacetime point: it is completely homogeneous. It follows that
all spacetime points have exactly the same geometrical properties—again, it
seems impossible to ground their individuality in their geometrical features.
PII then tells us that either there is only one point, or the individuality of
the special relativistic spacetime points is of a haecceistic, non-geometrical
nature.
The transition to general relativity does not alleviate this difficulty. First,
the famous “hole argument” strengthens the idea that haecceities are incom-
patible with the physics of the situation. Indeed, if the existence of haec-
ceities of spacetime points is accepted, this leads to an indeterminateness of
the physical description: given one description, infinitely many other empir-
ically equivalent descriptions can be given that differ only by the way they
are positioned in the spacetime manifold. These descriptions differ by virtue
of the haecceities of the spacetime points that are involved, but are exactly
the same as far as their geometrical properties and empirical predictions are
concerned. The hole argument can be summarized as the observation that if
this numerical diversity of descriptions (and therefore also of solutions of the
dynamical equations) is taken seriously, a radical indeterminism of physical
theory has to be accepted: there are in this case infinitely many empirically
equivalent evolutions, given any initial situation.
From a physical point of view these are all unnecessary complications:
haecceities are superfluous from an empirical viewpoint and constitute a
paradigm case of objectionable metaphysics. But their rejection has the con-
sequence that we are compelled to look for another basis of the individuality
of spacetime points, presumably by using PII.
But then our earlier problem repeats itself: also general relativity al-
1We employ the convention that time-like distances are positive; in the literature the
opposite convention that makes space-like distances positive is also sometimes used.
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lows spacetimes with a high degree of symmetry. Minkowski spacetime,
the special case of special relativity contained in general relativity, is only
one example. The standard cosmological models, the so-called Friedmann-
Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) spacetimes, furnish further instances.
These spacetimes allow the introduction of a cosmic time scale, at each in-
stant of which three-dimensional space is completely homogeneous. Repeti-
tion of the earlier argument based on PII then leads to the conclusion that
at each instant of cosmic time there is only one spatial point [18]. Evidently,
this conclusion conflicts with the way general relativity itself describes these
cosmological models.
3 Weak Discernibility
As Hawley points out [9], defenders of Leibniz’s principle can respond to
such putative counterexamples to PII in a variety of ways. First, they may
query whether the described situations are possible at all—this does not
appear to be a promising way out in our above examples, which are all
possible according to the relevant physical theories. Second, defenders of PII
can dispute that these situations are best described in terms of distinct but
indiscernible individuals. This can take two forms: either it may be argued
that a correct analysis of discernibility will reveal that the objects in question
are discernible after all, or it may be claimed that it was a mistake to assume
that there were distinct objects to start with—that there is actually only one
undivided whole.
The latter option should certainly be taken seriously. It can be argued
that the quantum case (the case of “identical quantum particles”) calls for
exactly this response: there are no individual fermions and bosons but there
is rather only one undivided quantum field [3, 4, 5]. Later we shall say a bit
more about the justification for thinking this. However, in the geometrical
cases, and in the cases of Black’s spheres and Kant’s hands, there are good
reasons for going another way. As we shall argue, here we are entitled to
think that we are in fact dealing with separate objects and that a more
refined analysis of discernibility can show this to be justifiable by PII.
In order to explain this more refined analysis we follow Saunders [14, 15],
who takes his cue from Quine [13], in noting that in cases like the ones men-
tioned above irreflexive relations are instantiated: i.e., relations that entities
cannot bear to themselves. Thus, Black’s spheres are at a non-zero distance
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from each other—but a sphere cannot be at a non-zero distance from itself2;
Kant’s hands are each other’s mirror images—but a hand cannot be its own
mirror image; and the points in the Euclidean plane have distances with
respect to each other that they cannot possess with respect to themselves.
Similarly, in each of the spaces-at-an-instant in the FLRW cosmological mod-
els general relativity defines a spatial distance function such that points do
not have non-zero distances with respect to themselves (at least as long as one
restricts oneself to spatial regions that are not too large—since these spaces
may be closed, the situation in the large may be analogous to that of points on
a circle). More generally, in arbitrary relativistic spacetimes irreflexive rela-
tions between points can be constructed on the basis of the four-dimensional
distance function that relativity theory defines on such spaces (see also [11]).
In the case of points with space-like or time-like separation this is obvious:
in this case there is a positive or negative distance between the points that
cannot exist between any point and itself (at least not within regions that
are not too extended). The prima facie more complicated case of points with
light-like separation (i.e. with four-distance zero) can be accommodated by
observing that any two distinct points that are light-like separated can be
connected via the combination of a non-zero time-like and a non-zero space-
like interval3, something which cannot hold for any point with respect to
itself.
The irreflexivity of these relations is the key to proving that (a generalized
version of) PII is satisfied after all: if an entity stands in a relation that it
cannot have to itself, there must be at least two entities.
To see in detail how this works, let us formalize the argument. PII can
be formulated as follows, with = denoting identity:
s = t ≡ ∀P (P (s)↔ P (t)). (1)
The universal quantifier here ranges over all physical predicates P (not haec-
ceities!). The right-hand side of the equation stipulates that s and t can
replace each other, salva veritate, in any P .
There can now be various kinds of discernibility ([15]). Two objects are
absolutely discernible if there is a one-place predicate that applies to only one
2We are here taking it for granted that the distance relations satisfy Euclidean geometry.
If, instead, the distances satisfied the geometry of a three-sphere, or another closed space,
the argument given below for the numerical diversity of the spheres could fail.
3Consider two points P and Q, such that the four-distance σ(P,Q) = 0. Then there
exists at least one point R such that σ(P,R) > 0 and σ(R,Q) < 0.
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of them; relatively discernible if there is a two-place predicate that applies
to them in only one order; and weakly discernible if an irreflexive two-place
predicate relates them. The latter possibility is relevant to our examples.
If there is an irreflexive but symmetric two-place predicate P (., .) that is
satisfied by s and t, the definition (1) requires that if s and t are to be
identical, we must have:
∀x(P (s, x)↔ P (t, x)). (2)
But this is false: in any valuation in which P (s, t) is true, P (t, t) cannot
be satisfied since P is irreflexive. It follows that PII is satisfied by any two
non-identical objects that stand in an irreflexive physical relation.
In our cases with irreflexive relations PII is therefore sufficient to ground
the numerical diversity of the objects after all. It should be noted, how-
ever, that although weak discernibility is thus able to lay a non-haecceistic
fundament under numerical diversity, this does not endow the objects with
individuality in the usual sense. Indeed, in the situations we have discussed
it remains impossible to pick out or define any single object. Because of the
symmetry any property or relation that can be attributed to one object can
equally be attributed to any other and we can therefore not identify any spe-
cific object. It is impossible, for example, to pin down any particular point
in the Euclidean plane on the basis of the properties of the plane and its
points, even if we include all relational properties (of course, we are speaking
here of the plane tout court, without adding by hand a preferred point that
could function as an origin).
This lack of identifiability may raise doubts on the meaningfulness of
the claim that there are more than one separate objects after all (cf. [10]).
However, in order that the number of elements in a domain is a well-defined
quantity it is sufficient that a function exists that maps the domain one-
to-one onto a set of labels, e.g. the set {1, 2, ..., n}; it is not required that
we can actually construct such a labelling. In the examples we have been
considering it was actually given in the description of the cases (two spheres,
two hands, many points) that such mappings exist, and the question to be
answered was simply whether this mapping could be given a basis via PII.
And as we have seen, this can be done with the help of irreflexive relations.
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4 Scientifically Respectable Objects and Re-
lations
It is important, of course, that the irreflexive relations we consider here are
scientifically respectable. If we started by just stipulating that a certain
domain is labelled by a set of natural numbers, between which there are
irreflexive relations, this would be completely empty. Labels can always be
posited abstractly, and there are always irreflexive relations between them;
for example, the irreflexive relation of “being unequal to each other” between
the natural numbers. Proceeding this way we would do nothing to make
it acceptable that the domain in question really splits up and consists of
physical objects. The numbers would in this case function as haecceities in
disguise, without scientific merit.
The possibility of “splitting up a domain” is certainly not a priori evident
in the context of discussions about whether or not PII applies. As we have
seen at the beginning of the previous section, one possible stance in such
discussions is to argue that there is no multiplicity at all: that there is only
one undivided physical system. No questions about the individuation of
elements of the domain by means of PII have to be answered if there is only
one system, and a parsimonious ontological picture results. If there is no
convincing reason to think of the domain as consisting of several separate
entities in the first place, this kind of holism recommends itself [8]. As
stressed before, what we need in order to think of numerical diversity is an
argument that the objects and the relations between them are scientifically
respectable and latch on to the structure of the domain as described by
physics.
It may be the case that there is nothing else to characterize the objects
in the domain than the relations they stand in. This possibility has been
worked out in structuralism, where objects are viewed as nodes in a rela-
tional network (this is compatible with the idea that the relations in their
turn can only exist if they connect actual relata [6]). So if we are going to
verify scientific respectability we need not necessarily assume that there is a
division of labor between “objecthood providers” that must be checked first
and relations that only become relevant later. A relational structure may
constitute our only access to the existence of entities—in fact, this is the
situation we shall encounter in the case of spacetime points.
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5 Spheres, Hands, Euros and Other Objects
Looking back at the examples of Black’s spheres and Kant’s hands, we see
that the objects there (spheres and hands, respectively) were characterized
independently of the relations that hold between them. The spheres were
stipulated to be of of a certain chemical composition (pure iron, says Black),
and of course they possess a definite geometrical shape. We know very well
what such spheres are like: they are doubtlessly physical objects. Similarly,
we are familiar with hands and do not doubt their status as physical entities.
The difficulty of these cases is not in deciding whether there are objects
at all, but rather in finding a basis for their numerical diversity: since the
physical characteristics are completely equal for both objects, PII seems to
suggest that there is actually only one of them. The information that an
irreflexive relation holds (being at a two-miles distance from each other and
being each other’s mirror images, respectively) now helps out: application
of PII demonstrates that there must be two objects—although the perfect
symmetry of the situation makes them only weakly discernible.
The uncontroversial physical nature of the irreflexive relations in question
is relevant here. For when we allow relations that refer to “fantasy predi-
cates”, not sanctioned by physics, there is no limit to the number of entities
that may result. One might for instance imagine that in every perfect iron
sphere a “mork” and a “gork” copy of this sphere coincide, and that since
these two qualities exclude each other (an irreflexive relation) we have actu-
ally two spheres. This example is simplistic and far-fetched, but the point
still stands that we should make sure that the relations we are considering
are bona fide from a scientific point of view if we wish to draw conclusions
about the number of scientifically respectable objects. If the relations are
our only access to the objects, it becomes even more pressing to verify their
scientific status.
A well-known more realistic example of irreflexive relations without there
even being any actual objects at all is the case of money in a bank account
(not coins in a piggy bank, but transferable money in a real bank account).
Imagine an account with five Euros. It is easy enough to speak about this
money as a collection of five entities, and a mapping of the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} to
the account can be defined in an abstract way (e.g., draw a circle representing
the total amount and divide it into 5 equal parts; or think of the mapping
as given by the order in which amounts of one Euro were transferred to the
account), but this does not prove anything about the actual presence of five
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individual entities in the account. On the contrary, the case of more than
one money units in a bank account is the standard example of absence of
individuality; it is a case in which only the account itself, with the total
amount of money in it, can be treated as possessing individuality [16, 17].
Although we are accustomed to using relations and things talk in this case
(e.g., “the last Euro that has come in is more important than the other ones”),
this talk does not represent the actual physical situation (it may represent
aspects of how that situation came about; but that is not our concern here).
A (more controversial!) example from present-day science comes from
quantum mechanics. A notorious interpretational issue in this theory is the
status of so-called “identical particles”: are these “particles” individual en-
tities or should they rather be described in a holistic way (in terms of one
field)? The theory suggests that there are distinct entities because it works
with indices 1, 2, 3, ..., n that label the one-particle Hilbert spaces (the quan-
tum mechanical state spaces) that can be used to construct the total state
space of the system. However, it is a general principle of quantum mechan-
ics that the state defined in this total space must be completely symmetrical
(the case of “bosons”) or anti-symmetrical (“fermions”) in these indices. This
symmetrization postulate implies that if the total state is restricted to any of
the one particle state spaces the result is exactly the same for all indices. It
follows that if these indices are to represent particles, any property or relation
that may be attributed to any one of these putative particle is attributable
to each of the others as well.
One response is to take this as a signal that there are no different particles
at all: although there is talk about the indices in the formalism in terms
of particles, this should be understood in the same way as talk about the
different Euros in a bank account. From a fundamental point of view it is
better, according to this line of reasoning, to renounce talk that suggests
the existence of individual particles and to reconceptualize the situation in
terms of the excited states of a field (analogous to thinking of the Euros in
an account as one sum of money). This response leads into the direction of
quantum field theory.
However, the situation is also reminiscent of Black’s spheres and Kant’s
hands. As we have seen there, symmetry is not decisive for proving the ab-
sence of Leibniz-style individuality: we may be facing a case of weak discerni-
bility. Perhaps there are irreflexive physical relations between the fermions
and bosons that guarantee their (weak) individuality in the same way as they
did for Black’s spheres and Kant’s hands [12, 15]. Now, we have already seen
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that in the total state indices 1, 2, 3, ..., n occur; and it is certainly possible to
define irreflexive relations between them (see [3, 4, 5, 12, 15] for details). But
does it follow that these indices correspond to weakly discernible entities?
6 To Be or Not to Be
Obviously, we know that spheres and hands are bona fide physical objects:
we possess direct experience with objects of this kind. But let us reflect for
a moment about the background of our certainty in these cases. We are
familiar with collections of more than one spheres and hands in asymmetri-
cal situations, where it is possible to uniquely distinguish and name them.
Typically, we think of two hands or two spheres as placed differently with
respect to ourselves as observers: one being at our left and one at our right,
for example. The possibility of these asymmetrical configurations gives us
confidence about the nature of spheres and hands even if they are placed in a
completely symmetrical situation. They are clearly entities of which several
copies can exist next to each other. The symmetrical configurations in which
they are only weakly discernible are limiting cases of more typical asymmetri-
cal situations in which a point of reference, an observer, or something similar
is given, and in which they are absolutely discernible.
Likewise, the typical context in which classical particles occur is that of
asymmetrical situations, in which the network of mutual distances suffices to
characterize each individual particle in an unambiguous way. Changing the
mutual distances so that the configuration becomes more symmetrical will
evidently do nothing to the nature of the objects: as long as the situation
is only slightly asymmetrical they will remain absolutely discernible physical
entities, whereas in the limiting case of complete symmetry they still are the
kind of entities that are candidates for absolute discernibility. There is no
indication in physical theory or anywhere else that there might be ontological
changes in the objects just because of approaching a fully symmetrical Black’s
spheres-type configuration.
The (standard, absolute) discernibility in asymmetrical situations, plus
the possibility of a limiting procedure, thus provides us with a test for phys-
ical relevance and physical objecthood in symmetrical situations. We are
justified in assuming the existence of actual entities (candidate individuals)
if the breaking of the symmetry is physically possible, does not involve any
change in the type of properties assigned, and results in a situation with
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distinguishable objects (this strategy resembles the one followed by Adams,
who proposes to compare Black’s spheres with spheres of which one has a
very slight chemical impurity [1, p. 17]).
These cases are to be contrasted with the case of the Euros in a bank
account. If we start with actual Euro coins, there is no limiting procedure
by means of which we can gradually approach Euros as units of transferable
money. There is consequently no argument here that bank account Euros
and Euro coins are ontologically similar. On the contrary, according to our
best available way of describing what is going on in bank accounts, there is
only a total amount of money in them, not composed of individual Euros.
To investigate into which category “identical quantum particles” fall, the
transferable Euro or the Black’s spheres one, we can try and copy the strat-
egy followed in the classical particle case, namely breaking the symmetry
and seeing whether absolutely discernible entities result. But here we run
into a difficulty of principle: quantum mechanics forbids “identical parti-
cle” systems that are not in a fully (anti-)symmetric state—it is a matter
of quantum mechanical law that “fermions” and “bosons” can only have ex-
actly the same states and relations. (A more accurate statement would be
that the indices occurring in the formalism must always be completely in-
terchangeable as far as physical features of the state are concerned.) This is
significantly different from the symmetrical classical cases, in which the sym-
metry was contingent and the theory allowed evolutions from symmetrical
to asymmetrical configurations. In quantum mechanics the mutual relations
between fermions cannot serve to distinguish individual component systems
as a matter of principle, and our earlier test fails.
It might be replied that this by itself does not yet prove that there are
no individual identical quantum particles—indeed, we could also imagine a
hypothetical classical world in which a law stipulates that perfect spheres
can only occur in completely symmetric configurations. But in such a world
we could still have good reasons to think in terms of individual spheres: our
theories could allow for an external object serving as a point of reference
that makes the spheres discernible (e.g., an observer who stands in different
relations to the various spheres). If no argument of this kind were to be
possible at all, the existence of individual spheres would surely become moot.
However, this is precisely the situation that obtains in quantum mechanics.
It follows from the quantum formalism, as a matter of law-like principle, that
“identical quantum particles” have exactly the same relations with respect
to any external vantage point that may be introduced [3, 4].
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More can and should certainly be said about the quantum case (cf. [5])—
the subject remains controversial. But the above should suffice to show that
it is not at all evident that “identical quantum particles” should be conceived
of as numerically diverse objects.
7 The Status of Spacetime Points
Where does this lead us with respect to the question of whether spacetime
points are individuals—and if so, in what way their individuality can be
grounded? In section 2 we have encountered the dilemma that the points in
the Euclidean plane have all their monadic and relational properties in com-
mon, as a consequence of the perfect homogeneity of the plane. If we wish to
avoid haecceities and try to ground the individuality of geometrical points in
their geometrical properties, this appears to lead to the conclusion that there
cannot be more than one point in the plane. The situation does not seem to
improve when we go from mathematics to physics: in Minkowski spacetime,
but also in symmetrical solutions of the field equations of general relativ-
ity (e.g., the FLRW models), spacetime points share again their properties
and the conclusion that on a non-haecceistic account this entails that the
universe consists of one lonely point has indeed been drawn in the literature
([18]—the author of this article intends this as a reductio of a non-haecceistic
structuralist position).
As we have explained in section 3, the notion of weak discernibility can
here come to the rescue. Both in the case of mathematical geometries and in
the case of physical (spacetime) geometries irreflexive relations exist between
the points. If these relations are admitted to the domain of relations used
in the application of Leibniz’s principle PII, logic dictates that a numerical
diversity of weakly indiscernible objects exists, exactly as needed.
However, we should not be too quick. As we have seen illustrated in
sections 4, 5 and 6, we need some guarantee that the thus defined weakly
discernible objects, and the relations between them, are scientifically re-
spectable: we should restrict the domains of quantification in PII so as to
avoid artificial predicates and properties.
When we look again at the mathematical example of Euclidean geometry
(in a modern axiomatization), the first thing to observe is that the geomet-
rical points here are not assumed to possess any properties except for what
is fixed by the relational structure to which they belong. It is possible to
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axiomatize the full geometry of the plane by describing it as a manifold of
elements on which a non-negative distance function is defined. So what we
have here is the structuralist possibility already alluded to at the end of
section 4, in which our only access to objecthood is provided by the rela-
tions between the objects. In the present case these relations are mutual
distances—and since distances greater than zero constitute irreflexive rela-
tions we recover the usual structure of the plane with its infinity of points as
weakly discernible objects. As long as we are discussing the plane as a purely
mathematical structure, the question of whether the distance relations are
significant or not and of whether it would not be better to describe the plane
as one undivided whole, does not arise: within mathematics the relational
structure is just posited to exist (either as being defined by us or as abstractly
existing in a mathematical sense) and studied as such.
The interesting questions pertain to physical respectability—even if a nu-
merically diverse mathematical structure is perfectly alright in itself, it can
still be asked whether its application to physical reality is justified. So con-
sider a physical counterpart to the Euclidean plane, namely the completely
homogeneous three-dimensional space that occurs in Newtonian physics. Here
also all points have exactly the same status, and can be understood as spec-
ified by the structure of distance relations in which they are the relata. This
leads again to an (uncountable) infinity of weakly discernible points. By
contrast to the purely mathematical case, however, we may now raise the
question whether the network of distances, and the points in it, are really
physically significant.
At first this may seem an absurd question: what could be more physically
significant than distances? However, we were considering empty Newtonian
space, without material contents. That means that there are no measur-
ing rods or physical processes that “feel” the distances. The introduction
of such material things would generally destroy the homogeneity that we
have assumed, and would lead to a completely different situation. Now, if
Newtonian physics were nothing but the study of empty Newtonian space,
the numerical diversity of the points in this space would fulfil no physical
role. In this case we would have no guarantee that the relational structure
and the points in it correspond to anything physical, and it would be fully
justified to think of space as one undivided entity. In other words, if only a
completely empty homogeneous space were physically possible, its internal
structure would have no obvious physical meaning. It could be stipulated to
exist, of course, but its status would be mathematical or metaphysical rather
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than physical.
But this is evidently not at all the predicament we are actually in. Real-
life applications of Newtonian physics deal with situations that are not even
nearly symmetrical, because they assume many objects with unequal proper-
ties in asymmetrical configurations. In such situations it generally becomes
possible to discern the spatial points absolutely, with the help of distances
and angles with respect to the objects that are present. This is analogous to
what happens when we add an origin and coordinate axes to the Euclidean
plane. The completely symmetrical homogeneous case thus appears as an
idealization, a limiting case of further and further abstracting from actual
asymmetries. If we look at all physically possible cases in Newtonian space
there can be no doubt about the physical significance of the absolutely dis-
cernible points, because the distinguishing relations will in some cases be
actually physically instantiated (by means of measuring rods, for example).
The physical significance of the relations and relata in the fully symmet-
rical cases thus follows from a comparison with other possible cases—put
differently, there is a modal aspect involved (where the modality is physical,
determined by physical theory).
Completely similar observations can be made for special and general rela-
tivity. If special relativity were exclusively a theory about empty Minkowski
spacetime, the physical significance of spacetime points in the theory would
be doubtful at most. And if general relativity were solely about completely
symmetrical FLRW universes the same would be true here. But in fact empty
Minkowski spacetime and the completely homogeneous FLRW cosmological
models are degenerate cases, that can be connected to more realistic, asym-
metric spacetimes via a limiting process. This is just like what we saw in
the examples of Black’s spheres and Kant’s hands: the physical significance
comes from a comparison with asymmetric situations.
8 Conclusion
In completely symmetrical situations Leibniz’s principle PII seems prima
facie unable to ground the individuality and numerical diversity of objects.
The notion of weak discernibility, using irreflexive relations, appears to come
to the rescue: although it cannot yield individuality in the ordinary sense
of identifiability, it is able to ground the numerical diversity of objects. In
particular, this seems to offer a way out to the problem of how to individuate
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points in space or spacetime.
What we have argued in this article is that we need a criterion to en-
sure that the weakly discernible objects that thus result are scientifically
respectable. In order to verify this we have to make sure that the irreflexive
relations upon which the weak discernibility hinges are scientifically rele-
vant. In particular, in the space and spacetime cases we need an argument
that the mutual distances between the points are physically significant. As
it turns out, this physical significance depends on the possibility, accord-
ing to physical theory, of situations in which the symmetry is broken: we
can only have empirical access to single objects (here: points) via relations
that make a distinction between different objects. If this is correct, the rele-
vance of the irreflexive relations used to establish weak discernibility depends
on their ability to ground absolute discernibility in asymmetrical situations.
Consequently, weak discernibility only helps out if it can be regarded as a
degenerate case of absolute discernibility.
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